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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6587  
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE  
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 1327  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0923  
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 1853  
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7651  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0701

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002821

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DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS (COPE), IO/UNP  
(WICKBERG), G (CURRIE)  
NSC FOR EPHU

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [UNSC](#) [ID](#) [BM](#)

SUBJECT: BURMA -- MISSION MAKES POINTS, BUT INDONESIA  
HESITANT ABOUT UNSC AS FORUM

REF: A. STATE 139713

[1](#)B. JAKARTA 2799 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b,d).

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY -- Per Ref A, Charge urged a key Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) contact to support a formal UNSC meeting and a Presidential Statement (PRST) on Burma. Indonesia continues to prefer dealing with Burma in the UN Human Rights Council--not the UNSC--however. Without a very quick change in policy, Indonesia is unlikely to stray from its established position before the planned October 5 UNSC meeting. While the USG continues to argue that the UNSC is the best forum to deal with Burma's negative regional impacts, Mission recommends that a PRST based as much as possible on the September 27 ASEAN Statement has the best chance of gaining Indonesian support. END SUMMARY

[1](#)2. (C) CHARGE MAKES POINTS -- Charge delivered Ref A demarche to Imron Cotan, Secretary General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) (second-in-charge), stressing the importance of a formal meeting to hear Special Envoy Gambari's report and the need for a strong PRST. Cotan replied that Indonesia has not changed its position that the UN Human Rights Council--and not the Security Council--was the proper venue for discussing Burma. The situation there does not represent a threat to international or regional peace and security, in the GOI's view.

[1](#)3. (C) Indonesia, Cotan added, wanted to be helpful and would carefully consider the proposal for a formal meeting and the draft PRST. He noted, however, that FM Wirajuda is currently on the way to Saudi Arabia for a religious obligation and is unavailable for consultations on this issue before the proposed October 5 UNSC meeting. Without the FM weighing in, Indonesia is unlikely to stray very far from its established position.

[1](#)4. (C) ...AND ON OTHER FRONTS -- Pol/C also delivered Ref A demarche to Gembong Prijono, a key staffer to Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Prijono said he understood the USG position and thought it unlikely that Indonesia would act to block a formal meeting or a PRST, preferring to go with the consensus. He said he would raise the matter with

Presidential Advisor Dino Djalal and with senior officials at DEPLU, urging them to review the USG's points.

15. (C) That said, Prijono noted there was a distinction between the Indonesian and U.S. approach. Rather than attempting to isolate the regime, Indonesia believed "a door should be left open" for the regime to undertake needed reforms without feeling under acute threat. President Yudhoyono--a former general who played a key role in Indonesia's democratic transition--could play a role in facilitating those reforms in Burma. Pol/C noted that that was very elegant and all, but the international community needed to take a strong stand right now or the Burmese regime would feel that it could get away with shooting civilians and brutalizing monks. Indonesia needed to get on board before this moment was lost.

16. (C) Pol/C also reviewed Ref A points with officials at DEPLU's Directorate of North American Affairs and Directorate of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

17. (SBU) FONMIN TAKES A STAND -- Speaking in Chicago on October 3, FM Wirajuda was quoted as stating that the key to solving Burma's problems was assuaging the military's fears about their fate in a democratic Burma. He dismissed as ineffective both the sanctions favored by Western states and the "constructive engagement" pursued by ASEAN countries. Instead, Wirajuda proposed a five-year transition period where the military would share power with civilian leaders. This approach, he argued, would build trust between the military and the opposition and facilitate the transition to fully democratic rule.

18. (C) DEPLU SecGen Cotan told the Charge that Wirajuda's

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proposal did not represent official GOI policy. It does, however, reflect Indonesia's long-held view that a transition period would reassure the regime and induce it to undertake needed reforms.

19. (C) WHY REINVENT THE WHEEL? -- Mission recommends that the UNSC PRST be modeled as much as possible on the September 27 ASEAN statement. Indonesia has already endorsed this very strong statement. Indeed, the Singapore DCM told the Charge that Indonesia supported strong language condemning the regime and calling for reform in Burma during ASEAN's deliberations on the statement. It would be difficult for the GOI to back away now. Re the GOI's view regarding the UNSC not being the best forum, we recommend that the USG keep emphasizing the regional impacts: refugees, drug and human trafficking, etc.  
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